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NON-FINANCIAL SHAREHOLDER ACTIVISM: A PROCESS MODEL FOR 
INFLUENCING CORPORATE ENVIRONMENTAL AND SOCIAL 
PERFORMANCE  
 
SUMMARY 
Shareholders have become increasingly active in endeavouring to influence companies’ 
environmental and social practices. In comparison with the mature field of financially-
motivated shareholder activism, limited enquiries have been carried out on its non-financial 
counterparts. This article synthesises the knowledge base through a review of the academic 
literature, exploring shareholder activism intended to impact corporate environmental and 
social performance. Theoretical perspectives appropriate to this phenomenon are critically 
appraised, in particular insights from social movement theory, Hirschman’s theory of exit, 
voice and loyalty and stakeholder salience theory, as well as the roles of signalling and 
symbolic management actions. Data from the literature are organised into a process model of 
non-financial shareholder influence. Underpinned by the influencing context, this 
conceptualisation centres on three primary shareholder interventions: divestment, dialogue 
and shareholder proposals. These interventions are enabled through a range of actors and 
tools: coalitions, non-governmental organisations, codes and indices, the media and 
regulators. The interaction between interventions and the enabling actors and tools helps to 
determine managers’ perceptions of shareholder salience. These perceptions subsequently 
shape the organisational behaviours that impact companies’ symbolic and substantive 
environmental and social performance. An agenda to direct future research in this burgeoning 
field is articulated.   
  
3 
 
INTRODUCTION 
Shareholder activism has been studied for more than a century (Gillan and Starks 2007; 
Rutterford 2012), tracking a trajectory of increasing influence on company managers 
(McKinsey & Company 2014). Typically, the purpose of this activism has been to improve a 
company’s financial performance (Martin and Nisar 2007; Schneider and Ryan 2011; Denes 
et al. 2017), and only comparatively recently have shareholder activists begun to prioritise 
environmental and social performance (Goranova and Ryan 2014). With the rise in awareness 
of global sustainability challenges among incoming generations, such priorities are now 
widely on display in the press (e.g. Flood 2015; McKibben 2015). In the United States (US) 
the number of shareholder proposals relating to environmental and social issues has risen by 
half in the past decade, with more than 400 in 2015 (US SIF 2016). The Interfaith Centre on 
Corporate Responsibility (ICCR) alone filed 67 climate-change related proposals that year 
(ICCR 2016).  
Academic examination of this sub-field of shareholder activism has commenced but is yet 
to establish a body of evidence comparable to that of financial shareholder activism. By way 
of illustration, Goranova and Ryan’s (2014) review of the academic literature brought 
together the streams of financial and social shareholder activism. In their table of activism 
outcomes, only 5 of 38 papers reviewed relate to social or environmental performance. 
Sjöström’s (2008) review of shareholder activism for corporate social responsibility, a 
construct integrally linked to corporate environmental and social performance (Aguinis and 
Glavas 2012), identified 34 articles and working papers, most of which were published after 
2003. The pace of publication has increased and more than half of the articles that form our 
article’s literature base appeared after Sjöström’s review. This burgeoning body of literature 
points to the need for the assembly and organisation of ideas which are currently partial and 
fragmented.  
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Our review locates, critically appraises and synthesises relevant academic literature that 
examines shareholders’ influence over companies’ environmental and social performance. 
The methodology used to develop the literature base for the review is described in an 
appendix. In summary, a systematic approach was used to create a foundational set of articles 
which was then supplemented through interactions with other academics and the wider 
literature base. Our article is situated in the context of a broad body of literature dealing with 
company stakeholders, classically described by Freeman as ‘any group or individual who can 
affect or is affected by the achievement of the organisation’s objectives’ (1984: 46). The 
subset of stakeholders of primary interest in this review is shareholders, those who have an 
ownership stake in the organisation, and the activity of these shareholders that will be 
examined is that of non-financial activism, the influencing of company environmental and 
social performance by using this ownership stake (Sjöström 2008). 
Most research has been carried out in the US and to a lesser extent the United Kingdom 
(UK). The reasons for this may include the well-established tradition of shareholder activism 
in the US (Rutterford 2012), the existence of the US ICCR’s large database on social 
shareholder activism (Clark et al. 2008), and the availability of detailed analysis on US 
companies’ social and environmental performance from, inter alia, KLD Research and 
Analytics and the US government’s Toxic Release Inventory (Fisher-Vanden and Thorburn 
2011).  
We now analyse the main theoretical approaches used in the expanding sub-field of non-
financial shareholder activism. We then provide a process model to show how shareholders 
may influence company management and how they may increase managers’ perceptions of 
their salience to achieve their aims. These shareholder interventions and their enablers are 
evaluated in light of the main theoretical approaches. Finally, an agenda for further research 
based on the process model is offered prior to concluding remarks. 
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THEORETICAL APPROACHES TO NON-FINANCIAL SHAREHOLDER 
ACTIVISM 
We have identified a range of theoretical approaches in the academic literature that deals with 
shareholder activism relating to company environmental and social performance. Exemplar 
references from this literature are provided in Table 1. What follows is an analysis of some of 
the most prominent and potentially useful theories that will in subsequent sections be brought 
to bear on a process model for this form of shareholder activism. 
Table 1: Primary theoretical approaches within the shareholder activism literature 
 
Theoretical perspective 
 
Exemplar references 
 
Agency theory Jensen and Meckling (1976); Fama (1980); Fama and Jensen 
(1983); Eisenhardt (1989). 
Stakeholder theory Freeman (1984); Donaldson and Preston (1995); Phillips et al. 
(2003); Hasnas (2013). 
Institutional theory DiMaggio and Powell (1983); Suddaby (2010); Greenwood et al. 
(2014); Meyer and Höllerer (2014).  
Social movement theory Tilly (1978); McAdam (1982); Davis and Thompson (1994). 
Exit, voice and loyalty Hirschman (1970); Hirschman (1980); Saunders (1992); Bahshur 
and Oc (2015). 
Signalling Spence (1974); Connelly et al. (2010); Taj (2016). 
Stakeholder salience theory Mitchell et al (1997); Neville et al. (2011). 
 
Understanding relationships: principals, stakeholders, institutions and social 
movements 
Agency theory would seem eminently suitable for explaining shareholder-management 
interaction because of its intuitive and legally based view that shareholders, as principals of 
the company, delegate authority to managers as their agents so that the latter may perform the 
service of managing the company (Jensen and Meckling 1976). This is indeed the primary 
framework deployed by scholars in the case of financial shareholder activism (Davis and 
Thompson 1994; Goranova and Ryan 2014). Yet it is less suitable to describe what is usually 
a minority group of shareholders (Logsdon and Van Buren 2009) attempting to exert 
influence over managers with respect to corporate environmental and social performance. In 
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such a situation, a simplistic application of agency theory results in the problems of 
determining the principal’s expectations and even exactly who the principal might be. 
Corporate financial performance over a period frequently serves as a proxy for the principal’s 
desires when financial shareholder activism is being considered (Boerner 2006). However, 
the interests of non-financial shareholder activists may diverge from those of other 
shareholders.  
The process of identifying the principal when the shareholder body is heterogeneous 
warrants examination in the light of stakeholder theory, which recognises that managers have 
to make decisions in light of a range of disparate and almost certainly conflicting interests 
(Parmar et al. 2010). Developed as it has been to cater for a set of actors ranging from 
employees to governments to trade associations, stakeholder theory can cope with a 
potentially heterogeneous shareholder base (Donaldson and Preston 1995). This descriptive 
capability is useful to map shareholder entities and their demands pertaining to corporate 
environmental and social performance (Lee 2008; Henisz et al. 2014). However, it falls short 
of being able to explain exactly how these shareholders’ influencing attempts may impact on 
the company itself (Frynas and Stephens 2015).  
What is needed is an understanding of how managers react to attempts by shareholders to 
influence aspects of company environmental and social performance. Institutional theory can 
be deployed usefully to describe intra-organisational processes (Bengtsson 2007; Luo et al. 
2012). It can be applied beyond a single organisation to explain phenomena at the level of the 
organisational field (Greenwood et al. 2014), which could prove helpful in describing the 
effects of non-financial shareholder activism on a particular industry or sector of business. It 
has been argued, however, that the theory’s primary purpose is to understand how and why 
organisations react to certain aspects of their environment and not to others (Suddaby 2010).  
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When a company’s environment includes a shareholder attempting to exert influence over 
its environmental or social performance, institutional theory suggests managers may take 
their cue from established norms (Daudigeos 2013); for example, by publishing a 
sustainability report. In an uncertain environment, organisations may adopt a mimetic 
strategy (DiMaggio and Powell 1983), modelling their response to activists on that of their 
peers with isomorphic results. Institutional theory also explains how coercion is an 
influencing mechanism that may work when others don’t (Kostova et al. 2008): a shareholder 
dissatisfied with, say, a company’s polluting activities may engage with government agencies 
to encourage enforcement of regulations. 
Institutional theory therefore seems to have important insights to offer when examining 
non-financial shareholder activism. In the company, it can explain the impact of managers’ 
actions on corporate environmental and social performance through an evaluation of how and 
why the actions of individuals take place (Suddaby 2015). Extending the analysis to the 
context in which companies operate, it may explain how non-financial shareholder influence 
is affected by such institutional conditions as regulation and the presence of non-
governmental organisations (NGOs) (Campbell 2007).  
Agency theory’s description of relationships with the company as a nexus of contracts 
(Fama 1980) fails to capture the range of actors that may be involved in non-financial 
shareholder activism—activism that may be described as comprising a social movement 
(Goranova and Ryan 2014). Social movement theory argues that such a movement is likely to 
form when the interests of actors are shared, are few and are readily recognised (Tilly 
1978)—a situation readily obtainable when shareholders are seeking to influence social and 
environmental company behaviour. A sense of shared identity and social ties help to develop 
social infrastructure, such as the ICCR, which allows mobilisation towards a specific 
objective as the activists begin to acquire control of required resources (Davis and Thompson 
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1994). Such mobilisation may be enhanced during periods of instability, such as protest 
action against globalisation, which render the status quo susceptible to influence (McAdam 
1982). We turn now to consider the influencing act itself. 
 
Forms of influence: exit, voice and loyalty 
Shareholder attempts to exert influence on company environmental or social practices are 
often described in terms of Hirschman’s (1970) concept of voice. In Hirschman’s conception, 
voice is a political action, aimed at changing an undesirable state of affairs while remaining 
invested in the company (Bahshur and Oc 2015). In the case of non-financial shareholder 
activism, action may take the form of dialogue with company managers, or shareholder 
proposals at a general meeting (Clark and Hebb 2005). 
Because most researchers adopt definitions of shareholder activism that exclude any 
fundamental change in the relationship between the shareholder and the company (Gillan and 
Starks 1998), divestment is usually excluded from the discussion (Rho 2006). By defining all 
shareholder activism as forms of voice, Hirschman’s second action, exit, is neglected, thereby 
reducing the theory’s explanatory power. In contrast to Goranova and Ryan (2014) we have 
included screening and divestment in our analysis, grouping them together in the process 
model we describe later. Screening based on social or environmental criteria is fundamental 
to most socially responsible investment approaches (Richardson and Cragg 2010) and it 
would seem unwise to exclude this. Similarly, there have been times such as during the 
campaigns against South African apartheid when divestment was a widely publicised form of 
shareholder activism (Beaty and Harari 1987). These activities also may be described in 
terms of the use of an ownership stake to exert influence. 
It would seem important to be able to explain why a shareholder may choose between the 
options of voice and exit. Hirschman (1970) attempted to do so by introducing a third 
construct, namely loyalty. Different from exit and voice in that it is not an action, loyalty can 
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be regarded as a moderator of these actions (Saunders 1992), its presence usually making exit 
less likely and voice more so (Hirschman 1970). While Barry (1974) is unnecessarily unkind 
in describing loyalty as ‘an ad hoc equation filler’, its usefulness is reduced because it is not 
the only determinant of the choice between exit and voice. Hirschman himself (1980) later 
noted that both voice and exit may be suppressed by external circumstances, regardless of 
loyalty. As we shall note later, these circumstances include the regulatory environment as 
well as the environmental or social issue of concern to the shareholder. 
Forms of response: signals and symbols 
To influence corporate environmental and social performance, shareholders will attempt to 
convey information to managers (Lewis and Mackenzie 2000; Haigh and Hazelton 2004; 
David et al. 2007), a form of signalling (Spence 1974). To achieve the shareholder’s aims this 
signalling needs to be observable by management (Connelly et al. 2010), and the anticipated 
outcomes of signalling may be adversely affected by unintended negative signalling (Taj 
2016). Managers in turn may send signals to shareholders, either in response to shareholder 
action or to pre-empt it (Goranova et al. 2007; Miller and Triana 2009; Zhang and Wiersema 
2009; Robinson et al. 2011).  
Having signalled to managers a desire for a change in company performance, it is 
reasonable for a shareholder to expect a response. Often the desired response would entail 
changes to company operations that are substantive—actual and concrete changes (Ashforth 
and Gibbs 1990). Managers may not wish to make these changes, however, and may 
therefore engage in symbolic actions that appear to conform to shareholders’ desires, but do 
not actually result in changes to organisational activities (Rodrigue et al. 2013). These 
symbolic actions are decoupled from actual practices (Meyer and Rowan 1977), but provide a 
legitimising explanation of company actions (Zajac and Westphal 1995). Managers may in 
this way lead shareholders to believe that their demands have been met, thereby relieving any 
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pressure being brought to bear upon them (Westphal and Zajac 1998). Such symbolic 
management may impact deleteriously on the effectiveness of shareholder influence, as we 
will note later. 
 
Acquiring managers’ attention: stakeholder salience 
Managers typically have many demands upon their time, and work in a world replete with 
conflicting signals. They are constantly having to answer, at least by their actions, Freeman’s 
question as to ‘who and what really counts’ (1994: 411), a question of identification: which 
stakeholders and which issues should they take into consideration? Shareholders seeking to 
exert influence naturally want managers to perceive them as salient. Mitchell et al. (1997) 
studied stakeholder identification and salience by considering stakeholder attributes. Defining 
salience as ‘the degree to which managers give priority to competing stakeholder claims’ (p. 
854), they proposed that a stakeholder’s salience may be determined by evaluating its 
attributes of power, legitimacy and urgency. Power is a stakeholder’s ability to get another 
entity to do something it otherwise would not have done; legitimacy is the perception that a 
stakeholder’s actions are desirable or appropriate; and urgency is the extent to which a 
stakeholder’s claims call for immediate attention (Mitchell et al. 1997). Gifford (2010) found 
the theory to be useful when applied to the shareholder subset of stakeholders, and we shall 
use its insights repeatedly in later discussion of our process model as we describe managerial 
perceptions and actions when under pressure from shareholders. 
It is surprising that this potentially useful theory has seen limited development (Neville et 
al. 2011). While salience has typically been understood in terms of perceptions (Mitchell et 
al. 2011), Eesley and Lenox (2006) redefined it in terms of actions. This may prove to be a 
useful modification, allowing for greater empirical assessment of the construct, not least 
when attempting to determine the effectiveness of shareholders’ attempts to influence 
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company performance. Neville et al. (2011) distinguished carefully between the stakeholder 
and the stakeholder’s claim, resulting in a more nuanced definition of stakeholder salience: 
‘the prioritisation of stakeholder claims by managers based on their perception of the degree 
of power of the stakeholder and the degree of moral legitimacy and urgency of the claim’ (p. 
369). They went on to show that managerial response is thus determined, at least in part, by 
managers’ identification and then prioritisation of the stakeholder itself, as well as by their 
identification and prioritisation of the claim the stakeholder is making on the organisation. 
Perrault and Clark (2016) found that stakeholder status and reputation affected managerial 
response, suggesting that Mitchell et al.’s (1997) model may be usefully extended to 
incorporate other elements. 
Having laid a foundation of theoretical perspectives on shareholder-manager interaction, 
we now discuss a process model that describes how shareholders may influence company 
environmental and social performance. 
A PROCESS MODEL FOR NON-FINANCIAL SHAREHOLDER INFLUENCE 
We chose the term ‘influence’ as it may be used to describe the interactions between 
shareholders and companies without unduly limiting the nature of these interactions. This 
terminology is in line with that used recently by Goranova and Ryan (2014) and McNulty and 
Nordberg (2016). We define influence as the altering of what would otherwise have been the 
course of events in the absence of an influencing intervention (Coughlan et al. 2001). In the 
context of shareholder-company interaction, such influence would not normally extend to the 
point where shareholders assume managerial duties: to do so would be to take on the very 
roles of the agents who are appointed to manage the company (Fama and Jensen 1983). 
Current codes of corporate conduct would not support shareholders taking on such a role, 
both because shareholders don’t have fiduciary duties to the company (Institute of Directors 
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of Southern Africa 2016), and because of the impracticality of attempting to manage a 
company by means of shareholder referendums (OECD 2015). 
The context of influence 
Figure 1 outlines a process model for shareholder influence on company environmental and 
social performance. It starts with the context in which this influencing takes place, as this has 
an impact on the influencing act and its outcomes. Current research distinguishes between 
institutional and smaller shareholders (Clark and Hebb 2005), not forgetting agency issues 
between investors and fund managers (Hirst in press), and the discussion that follows will 
show how different categories of shareholders may choose different approaches to exert 
influence. This is particularly pertinent to non-financial shareholder activism by actors as 
disparate as a giant pension fund such as CalPERS (Barber 2007) and an individual gadfly 
(Mathews 2015). Shareholders’ motivations may differ: for example, a union’s interest in 
employee working conditions (McCabe 2000), a pension fund’s consideration of the impact 
of a company’s activities on its other investments (Kiernan 2007), and an investor’s desire to 
reduce non-financial risk (Ho 2016).  
Figure 1: A process model for shareholder influence 
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Company characteristics and the sector in which a company operates have also been shown to 
impact shareholder actions (Judge et al. 2007). Adopting a social movement perspective, 
Rehbein et al. (2004) find evidence that company size is a determinant of whether 
shareholders may target it, and whether its environmental performance is of concern, or 
whether it is in an industry known to have a poor employment or community interaction 
record. Activists may elect to work in a cooperative manner with progressive companies, 
while candidly challenging companies adopting a policy of resistance (den Hond and de 
Bakker 2007). However, as will be described in greater detail in the discussion on the 
outcomes of shareholder influence, a company that sends accommodating signals to a 
shareholder may merely be engaging in a symbolic management exercise (Marcus and 
Goodman 1991).  
Changes in the regulatory environment over the years have been shown to impact 
significantly on shareholder activism (Rutterford 2012) and on its effects (Kock and Min 
2016). The means of this impact may range from facilitating shareholder proposals to 
encouraging socially responsible investment (Yamahaki and Frynas 2016). Lastly, to provoke 
shareholders to act there must be an environmental or social issue, or combination of issues, 
that matters sufficiently to shareholders for them to commence their activism (Judge et al. 
2007). The nature of the issue may determine the activist’s approach: an investor may, for 
example, see ethical screening as the only legitimate intervention in a particular industry 
(Van Duuren et al. 2016). It may also alter managerial perceptions of shareholder saliency: a 
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scandal recently unearthed could provide the support of urgency to the shareholder’s attempt 
at influence (Löscher 2012). 
Interventions 
A close reading of the literature reveals three fundamental influencing interventions available 
to shareholders: divestment of shares, dialogue with management, and shareholder proposals 
at general meetings. Linked to these interventions, the literature describes a set of enablers 
that may increase managers’ perceptions of the salience of the shareholder. We will now 
analyse these interventions and associated enablers, evaluating them in the light of the main 
theoretical perspectives described earlier. 
Divestment. Shareholders dissatisfied with a company’s environmental or social performance 
may choose to sell all or part of their shareholding in that company—classically described as 
Hirschman’s (1970) option of exit (Nooteboom 1999). The application of this influencing 
approach extends beyond simple divestment, as the same principle may lead to a shareholder 
not investing in a company, business sector or geography in the first place (Eccles and 
Viviers 2011) — a strategy of avoidance (Sparkes and Cowton 2004) commonly referred to 
as ethical screening (Collison et al. 2009). The flip-side of this screening approach, albeit less 
common, is best-of-breed investing (Hood et al. 2014) - investing only in companies that 
have particularly progressive environmental and social practices. This may be seen as 
extending Hirschman’s options of exit and voice to an antecedent action: entrance—a term 
only used in the literature more recently (Glac 2010). 
Divestment is not always practical. It presupposes the context of a reasonably liquid equity 
market to keep the cost of exit low, not the case for all companies or all markets (Wen 2009). 
Neither is it an option for passive investors bound to follow a specific index (Gifford 2010), 
the index here serving to enforce loyalty to its constituents. Furthermore, large investors may 
be unable to sell their holdings without substantially damaging share prices and their own 
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returns (Rao and Sivakumar 1999), again raising the exit cost. These are examples of why 
shareholders may exhibit apparent loyalty to a company, despite concerns over its 
environmental or social performance (McNulty and Nordberg 2016). 
Also, the effectiveness of the divestment intervention may be questioned. In the absence of 
any other engagement process, divestment or screening fails to send a clear signal to 
managers as to what aspects of a company’s environmental or social performance a 
shareholder is unhappy with (Eccles 2010). By divesting from (or not investing in) the 
company, investors forfeit the ability to exercise their voices as shareholders. A better way to 
wield the divestment stick, therefore, may be to signal to managers by threatening to sell, 
rather than by selling immediately (Gifford 2010; Crifo and Forget 2013). However, if the 
threat of divestment is to be perceived as salient by management, the consequent divestment 
or screening process must carry real, negative implications for the company. We turn to this 
now. 
Managers’ perceptions of the salience of divestment and screening activities may be seen 
in terms of the power that these actions have to affect the company’s cost of capital (Haigh 
and Hazelton 2004; Lewis and Mackenzie 2000). To have a measurable effect on the share 
price, however, a significant proportion of the investor community must refuse to hold the 
share in question, and this is not usually the case (Johnsen 2003). At the height of the anti-
apartheid divestment campaign, the IRRC concluded that ‘divestment will in all probability 
never have a direct economic effect on any South Africa-related company’ (Beaty and Harari 
1987: 38). Fossil fuel divestment and restriction policies are perhaps the equivalent course of 
action today, but in 2014 accounted for only $42.9 billion in money manager and institutional 
investment assets - barely 0.1% of the $36.8 trillion assets under professional management in 
the US (US SIF 2015). It is apparent, therefore, that managers need not worry overmuch 
about their companies’ cost of capital being materially affected by ethical investors who rely 
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on screening and divestment approaches, unless these investors become far more prevalent. 
Given this lack of power, shareholders contemplating the use of this intervention to influence 
managers may need to consider increasing managers’ perceptions of the legitimacy and 
urgency of their demands by involving one or more of the enablers that we will describe later.  
Dialogue. Shareholders may exercise their voices (Hirschman 1970) by engaging in dialogue 
with a company’s management with a view to influencing the company’s environmental and 
social performance. While such dialogue is usually conducted in private (Logsdon and Van 
Buren 2009), the shareholder may write articles, issue press briefings, address conferences or 
become involved in industry initiatives (Lewis and Mackenzie 2000), thereby adding an 
element of urgency to the discussions. Public confrontation, however, is generally regarded 
as fundamentally different to dialogue (Logsdon and Van Buren 2009), and may harm 
managers’ perceptions of the legitimacy of the shareholder’s demands. 
Dialogue may be used as a stand-alone intervention. This is frequently the case with large 
institutional shareholders who find it comparatively easy to gain access to a company’s 
management because managers recognise their power and legitimacy (Gifford 2010). 
Furthermore, such shareholders usually do not wish their activism to become public 
knowledge, lest the company in which they have invested be damaged (Wen 2009). These 
shareholders may be too large to easily exit their investment and, therefore, they are likely to 
seek to exercise influence via their voice (Hirschman 1970). More usually, dialogue is part of 
a broader process of interaction and is typically a precursor to a shareholder resolution (Haigh 
and Hazelton 2004; Sparkes and Cowton 2004). 
There are times, however, when dialogue only occurs once a resolution has already been 
submitted (O’Rourke 2003). In this case the urgency associated with the shareholder 
resolution process may have raised managers’ perceptions of the salience of the shareholder’s 
demand and they may then elect to enter into dialogue with the shareholder. There are other 
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factors that may cause a company to agree to engage privately with shareholders. By keeping 
the engagement behind closed doors, potentially reputation-damaging issues can be kept from 
the media, and political actors such as regulators can be kept ignorant of problematic 
environmental and social corporate performance (Rehbein et al. 2013). Secrecy makes it 
difficult for powerful and legitimate shareholder/stakeholder coalitions to form around shared 
interests, thus reducing the possibility of social mobilisation and allowing the company more 
flexibility to shape the dialogue’s agenda (Rehbein et al. 2013). 
Given the time and resources expended by both shareholders and managers in the process, 
it would seem important for both parties to determine how effective dialogue is for 
influencing companies’ environmental and social performance. The evidence in the academic 
literature on this is both incomplete and inconclusive. Dialogue may result in the shareholder 
obtaining preferential access to information not readily available in the public domain (Clark 
and Hebb 2005; Logsdon and Van Buren 2009), which may be the shareholder’s desired 
outcome. By its nature dialogue is likely to result in managers reaching a better 
understanding of the expectations of shareholders, potentially causing them to alter company 
practices accordingly (Logsdon and Van Buren 2009). While these outcomes reduce 
information asymmetry between the parties by enabling the two-way signalling process, they 
don’t necessarily constitute a substantive impact by shareholders on environmental and social 
performance. However, the process may enable shareholders to signal clearly to managers 
what their expectations are, allowing managers to understand shareholders’ motivations. As 
Van Cranenburgh et al. (2013) show in a broader stakeholder context, this may help 
managers formulate responses that are practical for the company and address at least in part 
shareholders’ concerns. It may, however, also enable them to merely craft a more plausible 
symbolic response instead of encouraging a substantive change in corporate performance 
(Westphal and Zajac 1998). 
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There are indications that companies may acquiesce to shareholder requests simply 
because they do not have the time or resources for lengthy dialogue (Rehbein et al. 2013). 
Such acquiescence may, however, be merely a symbolic management exercise by managers 
(Westphal and Zajac 1994). Reviewing research into one institutional investor’s ongoing 
dialogue with companies on social issues, Wen (2009) notes that managers responded to the 
investor’s concerns in more than 95% of cases. Sparkes and Cowton (2004) are less sanguine 
in their assessment of the effectiveness of dialogue, finding that NGOs campaigning in the 
public arena view private dialogue as futile. Lewis and Mackenzie (2000) observe that much 
dialogue in the UK is limited to investors requesting clarity on company policy and informing 
the company of the investors’ own ethics policies—symbolic actions not likely to influence 
environmental and social performance significantly. 
What is evident from the literature is that the effectiveness of dialogue is difficult to 
research, not least because of the lack of public artefacts (Logsdon and Van Buren 2009; Wen 
2009). When the content of discussions that take place in secret is unknown, and when even 
the fact that such discussions have taken place may not be disclosed, it is practically 
impossible to draw lines of correlation, let alone causation, between shareholder-manager 
dialogue and a change in a company’s environmental or social performance (Mallow and 
Sethi 2016). It is doubtless because it is difficult to research this approach to influencing that 
most of the empirical literature describing shareholder activism concentrates on shareholder 
proposals, for which information is readily available. This is despite the reported increasing 
popularity of the use of dialogue (Rehbein et al. 2013) and despite the widely held view that 
dialogue is more powerful than public activism (Goranova and Ryan 2014). 
Examples certainly exist of investors claiming that their entering into dialogue with a 
company resulted in changes to that company’s actions. Two cases in point are USS’s 
interactions with Balfour Beatty and with GlaxoSmithKline (Clark and Hebb 2005). 
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However, in neither case did the companies acknowledge that shareholder influence played 
any part in changing its actions. A detailed study of Goldcorp’s interaction with a shareholder 
coalition does show a changed approach, but whether that change was substantive is 
questioned by the researcher himself (Dhir 2012). 
In summary, except for the role that dialogue may play in the shareholder proposal 
process, or the threat of a shareholder making use of this process (Lewis and Mackenzie 
2000), there is no unequivocal evidence in the reviewed literature that shows that shareholder 
dialogue impacts on managers’ actions with respect to environmental or social issues. This 
implies that shareholders are not in a position to determine the extent to which they should 
deploy their resources in this area as opposed to choosing an alternative approach to 
influencing, nor can they determine how they may best increase managers’ perceptions of 
their salience in the dialogue process. 
Shareholder proposals. There is another way in which shareholders may choose to make 
their voices heard, rather than exiting their investment (Hirschman 1970). In many 
jurisdictions, shareholders have a right to present proposals at a company’s Annual General 
Meeting (AGM) and invite other shareholders or their proxies to vote on them (Gillan and 
Starks 2007).  
In the past, most proposals relating to environmental and social issues were filed by small 
shareholders and faith-based groups for whom financial return was not the sole determinant 
of their investment strategy. Their numbers have now been swelled by share-owning NGOs 
and unions (Matsusaka et al. 2016), as well as an increasing number of institutional investors 
for whom divestment is an unattractive option (BlackRock 2016). Because this particular 
process of shareholder-management interaction is arguably the focus of environmental and 
social shareholder activism (Lydenberg 2007), it is well worth examining its outcomes. The 
norm is for shareholder resolutions on social and environmental issues to fail to be passed by 
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vote (Haigh and Hazelton 2004), as it is seldom the case that interest in such resolutions is 
widely held. Even when this hurdle is crossed, the resolution is only precatory (Dhir 2012) 
and thus not binding, although companies are increasingly likely to implement resolutions 
that do achieve a majority vote (Goranova and Ryan 2014). This is probably a result of the 
perceived legitimacy of a significant proportion of shareholders expressing their views in this 
way. 
The shareholder proposal process, sometimes referred to as the proxy process (Amao and 
Amaeshi 2008), does, however, allow shareholders to exert influence. It is a formal way for 
shareholders to signal their discontent with a company’s policies and practices (David et al. 
2007), thereby bringing an issue to the attention of management. The effort required to 
prepare and submit such proposals may also increase managers’ perceptions of the salience of 
these shareholders, their perceived legitimacy being increased by their demonstrably taking 
the matter seriously (Gifford 2010). 
Being a public process, it exposes aspects of a company’s policies and practices to a 
variety of stakeholders (David et al. 2007). If these stakeholders have similar interests, this 
may provide an opportunity to develop a social infrastructure to mobilise more broadly to 
pressure the company. This, in turn, may lead to managers seeing the shareholder as more 
powerful and imparting a sense of urgency to their responses. A tabled proposal may lead to 
negative publicity and a level of embarrassment for company managers (Clark et al. 2008). 
Proposals may be a useful public education tool (Emel 2002) and may influence political 
processes involving regulators and others, using existing social infrastructure for mobilisation 
purposes. A perceived increase in urgency may then lead to management engaging in 
dialogue with the shareholder concerned (Dhir 2012), an outcome which is possibly the 
shareholder’s main objective (O’Rourke 2003).  
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The literature on substantive outcomes of the proposal process is ambiguous (Clark et al. 
2008). Dhir (2012) remarks that shareholder proposals may translate into future company 
policy, although this may be decoupled from company practice. A limited range of case-study 
research has provided some evidence of shareholder resolutions leading to improvements in 
companies’ social and environmental performance (e.g. Emel (2002) on Freeport-McMoran). 
It appears more common, however, for shareholder activism to be reported without clear 
indications of its effects (e.g. Sjöström (2010) on Cisco, Google and Yahoo!). The IRRC’s 
database notes shareholder resolutions that were withdrawn before voting as an indicator that 
some form of compromise between the shareholder and management was reached. However, 
no convincing data exist showing whether companies made any substantive changes desired 
by the shareholder after the proposal was withdrawn (O’Rourke 2003). 
More frequent in the literature are observations that such interventions are largely 
unsuccessful (Haigh and Hazelton 2004), leading at best to marginal changes in company 
practices. It would be an unusual manager who would willingly give up executive power to a 
shareholder, so a shareholder proposal may lead to the unintended consequence of managers 
acting to safeguard their discretionary powers (David et al. 2007). David et al.’s (2007) 
research establishes a negative relationship between proposals and corporate social 
performance, a finding explainable in terms of symbolic managerial action (Westphal and 
Zajac 1998). Fisher-Vanden and Thorburn (2011) established that climate-related shareholder 
resolutions led to companies joining the Climate Leaders and Carbon Disclosure Project 
(CDP) voluntary initiatives—symbolic actions. 
Nevertheless, there is evidence that resolutions become more effective in changing 
practice if the company or its peers have previously been targeted in this way (Reid and 
Toffel 2009). Proffitt and Spicer (2006) attribute this path-dependent effect to the impact of 
an increase in perceived legitimacy of the shareholder by the company’s management. 
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O’Rourke (2003) suggests that the shareholder proposal process may be effective, but only as 
part of a larger campaign. As noted earlier, mobilisation around the issue of interest will be 
facilitated by the building of social infrastructure, particularly in a context of political 
opportunity (Davis and Thompson 1994). 
Not all shareholders see the process as useful, with some viewing it as a blunt and often 
ineffective instrument (Clark and Hebb 2005). The very specificity of many environmental 
and social proposals may count against their gaining support from a majority of shareholders 
(Towner 2014). This is borne out by social movement theory’s emphasis on the importance 
of issues needing to be both shared and readily recognised (Davis and Thompson 1994). 
 
 
Enabling actors and tools 
We turn now to a set of actors and tools that may serve as enablers, enhancing (or perhaps 
detracting from) the perceived salience of shareholders seeking to exert influence through the 
three interventions analysed above. The interactions between the enablers and the shareholder 
interventions take place in a multiplicity of ways. Shareholders may form coalitions, 
collectively mobilising to introduce proposals to advance their interests. NGOs may take up 
shareholdings to exercise influence. Other shareholders may create investment codes to 
promote environmental responsibility and solicit the support of the media and regulators to 
further their aims. 
Coalitions. Interaction between a shareholder and a company need not be one-on-one nor 
need it be direct; there is a range of other possibilities. A high proportion of attempts by 
shareholders to influence companies on environmental or social matters arise from 
shareholder coalitions. One of the best-known is the ICCR (Dion 2009), founded in 1971. 
Numerous other shareholder-led coalitions exist, ranging from those such as the Council of 
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Institutional Investors (Lewis and Mackenzie 2000) which were set up to promote 
shareholder influence in general, to organisations such as the Shareholder Action Network 
(Haigh 2006) that focus on social and environmental issues.  
The roles that these organisations play varies considerably, but there are some functions 
that most of them fulfil to some extent at least. They follow developments in their area of 
interest, identify relevant issues for action, disseminate information relating to these issues, 
and propose strategies and tactics for action (Neubaum and Zahra 2006). They also serve as a 
rallying point for individual shareholders seeking to influence companies (Clark et al. 2008). 
Shareholder activism can be costly, and these organisations facilitate cost-sharing with other 
shareholders (Neubaum and Zahra 2006). These activities are readily described in terms of 
social movement theory, as they bring together shareholders who share similar interests and 
often focus on just one or a few of these interests. They provide a social infrastructure by 
facilitating ties between shareholders and afford them a shared identity—that of being 
members of a like-minded crowd. Lastly, they promote mobilisation by pooling and 
controlling coalition member resources.  
There is broad agreement in the academic literature on the factors that may make such 
coalitions influential. Tighter coalition coordination increases shareholder salience in the eyes 
of managers (Neubaum and Zahra 2006). The involvement of large and hence apparently 
powerful institutional investors is generally regarded as important (Sparkes and Cowton 
2004), their status increasing the salience of other shareholders (Perrault and Clark 2016). 
Clear framing by coalitions of the sometimes disparate voices of an array of shareholders 
makes it easier for managers to understand shareholders’ expectations (Neubaum and Zahra 
2006), ensuring the clarity of signals that are sent. 
Nevertheless, as already noted, evidence of the ability of these coalitions to effect changes 
in companies’ environmental or social performance is not overwhelming. One likely reason is 
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that, as indicated earlier, managers are unlikely to attribute their actions on environmental or 
social performance to shareholder pressure. What coalitions do provide, however, is an 
opportunity for individual shareholders to increase managers’ perceptions of their salience by 
helping to create the conditions of a social movement, bringing together actors with shared 
interests and pooling resources to facilitate mobilisation.   
Non-governmental organisations. A stakeholder that has become increasingly influential 
(Guay et al. 2004) is the NGO wishing to make its voice heard. Some NGOs, such as the 
CDP, establish codes of practice or reporting (Luo et al. 2012) that may be used as tools by 
shareholders. These will be considered in the section immediately following this one. NGOs 
include religious, environmental, labour and other interest groups (Logsdon and Van Buren 
2009). They may elect to purchase a shareholding specifically to exert influence over a 
company’s environmental or social performance, perhaps hoping that better organisational 
knowledge may strengthen their arguments (Briscoe and Gupta 2016). Some such as 
ShareAction (ShareAction 2016) provide shareholders with tools and encouragement to 
exercise their voice on corporate environmental and social performance. NGOs such as Fossil 
Free Stanford (Fossil Free Stanford 2015) encourage shareholders to divest themselves of 
companies of whose performance they disapprove. Rather like shareholder coalitions, they 
may contribute towards the shareholder activism movement by mobilising shareholders with 
specific interests, providing the social infrastructure for the group to thrive in. However, their 
activities are not normally restricted to purely shareholder-based actions and tend to include 
other influencing interventions such as boycotts, demonstrations and media campaigns (Emel 
2002).  
The actual effect of NGOs’ activities on companies’ performance is uncertain, however 
(Guay et al. 2004; Marshall et al. 2007). Emel (2002) found that companies were prepared to 
be influenced by NGOs only in non-core areas of their operations, such as the provision of 
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social services. Managers may elect to address NGO pressure in symbolic ways by arranging 
site visits, preparing reports and supplying press releases (Kolk 1999), thereby signalling 
their apparent responsiveness and potentially defusing conflict with shareholders and other 
stakeholders (Nartey et al. 2013) while not changing the company’s substantive performance. 
Indices and codes. This category of enablers comprises tools rather than actors that 
shareholders may use to increase managers’ perceptions of their salience. Some examples are 
sustainability indices such as the Dow Jones Sustainability Index (DJSI), the FTSE4Good, 
and the FTSE/JSE Johannesburg Stock Exchange’s Socially Responsible Investment Index 
(JSE SRI) (Collison et al. 2009; Hamann et al. 2009; Robinson et al. 2011), the last-named 
having recently become the FTSE/JSE Responsible Investment Index. Others are sets of 
principles such as the United Nations Global Compact’s Principles for Responsible 
Investment (Post 2013), and still others are reporting standards and platforms such as the 
CDP. The sources of such indices and codes may range from NGOs to professional bodies to 
companies (Kolk et al. 1999), or to combinations of a variety of stakeholders (Fransen and 
Kolk 2007). (Government actors will be discussed below, but it is worth noting that some of 
these initiatives can be classified as a form of civil regulation (Kolk et al. 2008).) 
Shareholders may use these tools in a variety of ways. They may demand that companies 
comply with industry codes. They may divest from companies that are not part of a 
sustainability index. They may make use of information from company reports prepared in 
accordance with such codes to take decisions about who and how to target with their 
influencing interventions. They may pressure managers to demonstrate the quality of their 
disclosures by employing external assurance providers (Perego and Kolk 2012). 
There are those who hold the view that standards such as these exercise substantive 
influence, and that companies and whole industries will change their behaviour if their 
performance is observed, measured and reported (Reid and Toffel 2009; Slager et al. 2012). 
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Empirical evidence offers little support for this belief. Cho et al. (2012) even found that 
company environmental performance is negatively related to membership of the DJSI, 
another example of symbolic management activities.  
Part of the reason for this may be that such indices and codes can be used by managers to 
either pre-empt or respond to shareholder pressure. Once a company has appeared on an 
index or is shown to have implemented a code, the salience of shareholder demands may 
diminish as a result of the company having enhanced its own legitimacy. This reduces, at 
least relatively, the legitimacy of shareholder demands. Cho et al. (2012) note that inclusion 
in the DJSI relates more to the symbolic action of disclosure than actual performance, and 
that the DJSI thus appears to be reducing companies’ incentives to improve their 
performance. In their assessment of the FTSE4Good, Collison et al. (2009) found nothing to 
contradict these results, noting that engagement with companies at risk of being excluded 
from the index does result in the criteria of the index being met. These criteria, however, 
focus on policies and disclosure rather than substantive performance. In the South African 
context, Hamann et al. (2009) found no statistically significant evidence of membership of 
what was then the JSE SRI being linked to corporate social performance, with the sole 
exception of Black Economic Empowerment indicators.  
Media. The media may be described as an enabling actor, providing shareholders with a 
means to exercise and strengthen their voice (Flew 2009). The media are certainly able to 
increase the salience of other actors, mainly by exercising normative power (Gifford 2010), 
often through threatening an executive’s reputation and public standing (Neubaum and Zahra 
2006). Jia et al. (2016) found that in the context of environmental performance the more 
negative and more local the media coverage, the greater the impact on corporate 
performance. The media may also be used by shareholders who are threatening to divest or 
who are attempting to solicit support for a proposal scheduled to be voted on at an AGM 
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(O’Rourke 2003), enhancing the volume and potentially the clarity of the signal they wish to 
send to the company’s management. The effects of a shareholder’s involvement of the media 
in a matter of environmental or social performance may also extend beyond the target 
company. Similar companies may perceive such action as a threat that they may be next in 
line or may be adversely affected by dint of their operating in the same sector (Waldron et al. 
2013)—a mimetic force acting at the level of the institutional field. 
However, as noted earlier, use of the media may also detract from a shareholder’s 
perceived legitimacy and undermine whatever relationship may exist with the company 
(Gifford 2010). A compromise approach is to use the media to raise awareness of particular 
issues rather than to publicly confront a company (Gifford 2010), thereby permitting 
mobilisation on an issue without directly targeting an individual company. While media 
campaigns are often referred to in the literature as a useful tool for exerting influence (Oh et 
al. 2013), there is little clear evidence of their stand-alone effectiveness when it comes to 
changing a company’s environmental or social impacts. The media are also available to 
companies, who may use them to weaken a shareholder’s influencing attempts (Kolk, 1999; 
Henisz 2014), possibly detracting from company performance in the process (Calveras and 
Ganuza 2016). Returning to the foundations of social movement theory, it may be best for 
shareholders to view media use critically, focusing on where this can publicise shareholder 
interests (Davis and Thompson 1994) and, perhaps more controversially, destabilise the 
political status quo (McAdam 1982).  
Regulators. The regulating environment is described in our process model as a contextual 
factor, an antecedent to shareholder influence (Kolk and Levy 2001). It was, after all, a 
change in regulation that allowed social and environmental shareholder proposals to be first 
filed in the US in 1970 (Goranova and Ryan 2014). That change in regulation was achieved 
by an activist in the District of Columbia Court of Appeals (Medical Committee for Human 
  
28 
 
Rights v. SEC). Such action falls within Hirschman’s (1970) construct of voice, as he 
describes the situation where an appeal is made through another entity which enjoys some 
measure of influence over the company. It would be incorrect, however, to limit the role of 
regulators to the context in which shareholder influence is exerted, as they can fulfil a directly 
interventionist role too. It is noteworthy that other forms of shareholder influence rely largely 
on management’s cooperation to be effective. Regulators are not limited in this way 
(O’Rourke 2003) and, therefore, may enable shareholders to increase dramatically their 
salience in terms of power and urgency. 
Regulators may enhance shareholder salience in several ways. Shareholders may threaten 
to lobby regulators when managers prove resistant to their demands, and there is evidence 
that, in accordance with social movement theory’s predictions, shareholder activism is more 
effective when companies or sectors are under the threat of regulation (Reid and Toffel 
2009). Regulators may make use of information from shareholder activists to develop 
appropriate legislation and enforcement regimes (David et al. 2007; Rehbein et al. 2013). 
Regulators may even facilitate activism by supporting shareholder initiatives (Gifford 2010). 
Lastly, there are externalities that can only be addressed effectively by regulators (Haigh and 
Hazelton 2004), and in these cases it makes sense for shareholders to involve the authorities 
accordingly.  
Managers faced with concerted action by shareholders and regulators may react in a 
variety of ways. They may, of course, simply comply with what government asks of them 
(Ward et al. 2009). Historically, however, they have engaged in corporate political activity to 
oppose regulatory action (Kolk and Pinkse 2005; Hadani et al. 2016). In a similar manner to 
that described above, they may form coalitions to increase government’s perceptions of their 
own salience (Kolk and Pinkse 2007). They may also promote the adoption of voluntary 
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environmental and social programmes to deflect onerous regulatory instruments (Lyon and 
Maxwell 2007).  
Managers’ perceptions of shareholder salience 
Managers are not noted for a desire to give up their autonomy to parties external to the 
company (Gelter 2009). Therefore, for a shareholder to exert influence over managerial 
decision-making to effect a change in corporate environmental or social performance, 
managers will need to perceive the shareholder as salient (Waldron et al. 2013). As noted 
earlier, Mitchell et al. (1997) have suggested that this salience may be expressed in terms of 
stakeholder power, legitimacy and urgency, with other attributes such as status and reputation 
also playing a role (Perrault and Clark 2016). 
The influencing context has a role to play in establishing the perceived salience of a 
shareholder. A shareholder may enjoy greater power and legitimacy if its shareholding is 
relatively large (Clark and Hebb 2005), or if it has a reputation for directing adverse media 
attention to corporate targets (Waldron et al. 2013), salience here being increased by threat. A 
sympathetic regulatory environment may affect a shareholder’s perceived power (Kock and 
Min 2016), and the nature of the environmental or social issues under consideration are likely 
to affect managerial perceptions of the influencing attempt, particularly if peer companies 
have already been targeted (Judge et al. 2007; Waldron et al. 2013). The nature of the claim 
the shareholder has on the company will also impact on managerial perceptions, particularly 
its moral legitimacy (Neville et al. 2011; Dhir 2012).  
We have also seen that shareholder salience may be perceived not just in terms of the 
identity and characteristics of the shareholder (Mitchell et al. 1997), but in terms of the action 
taken by the shareholder (Eesley and Lenox 2006). The threat of divestment provides a 
shareholder with power and urgency only to the extent that its shareholding is both significant 
and unlikely to be taken up by another investor at a price comparable to that already ruling 
  
30 
 
(Beaty and Harari 1987). Similar constraints apply in reverse to an investor that has screened 
a company out of its potential investment universe, with probably even less perceived 
legitimacy because it currently has no shareholding in the company (Johnsen 2003). Dialogue 
exercised alone may enhance managers’ perceptions of the shareholder’s legitimacy, but 
offers little in the way of power and urgency (Rehbein et al. 2013). Shareholder proposals 
make use of a legitimate regulatory approach to influence, but their power is restricted by the 
need to gather wide-spread support, as well as by managers’ knowledge that the vote is 
usually non-binding (Dhir 2012). 
Managers will tend to see coalitions of shareholders as having greater power, legitimacy 
and status than individual shareholders (Neubaum and Zahra 2006; Perrault and Clark 2016), 
and an NGO may offer a similar boost to a shareholder seeking to exercise influence (Emel 
2002). Codes and indices may provide legitimacy to shareholders seeking changes in 
corporate performance (Kolk et al. 2008), potentially adding mimetic pressure if they are 
adopted by a company’s peers (Perego and Kolk 2012). The media can raise both the power 
and urgency of a shareholder’s efforts (Gifford 2010), while regulators, whose legitimacy 
depends on the legitimacy of the ruling government itself, can similarly enhance managerial 
perceptions of power and urgency (O’Rourke 2003). 
Outcomes: symbolic and substantive 
The outcomes sought by shareholders seeking to influence corporate social and 
environmental performance are as heterogeneous as the shareholder base and the range of 
environmental and social issues of potential interest. A shareholder may wish only to receive 
a briefing from managers on the company’s social policies (Clark and Hebb 2005) or may 
demand that an oil company ceases drilling in ecologically sensitive areas (King 2014). This 
diversity in shareholder expectations means that overall remarks about the outcomes of non-
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financial shareholder activism risk being either misleadingly superficial or unhelpfully case-
specific. However, some summary observations may be made with a degree of confidence. 
When used alone, divestment or screening interventions offer managers limited 
information and, therefore, have minimal impact on their decision-making with respect to 
environmental or social company practices (Eccles 2010). While the dialogue process 
facilitates clear signalling from shareholders as well as managers, its confidential nature 
prevents us from drawing firm conclusions as to its effectiveness (Logsdon and Van Buren 
2009). Shareholder proposals, which provide information to managers and may be readily 
observed, have been shown to result in changes to company policy, but have had little 
demonstrable impact on substantive company practice (Dhir 2012)—an example of symbolic 
management action. 
Coalitions can enhance the salience of shareholders engaging in any of these three 
interventions (Neubaum and Zahra 2006), as can NGOs, but the resultant outcomes remain 
constrained. However, in certain circumstances NGOs may be satisfied by a symbolic 
response from companies such as increased disclosure (Marshall and Brown 2007). 
Shareholders who pressure companies to implement codes and indices may in fact encourage 
managers to act symbolically to the detriment of substantive corporate environmental and 
social performance (Cho et al. 2012). Involving the media may well strengthen shareholders’ 
influence over managers, but is also likely to cause managers to deploy at least some 
company resources to fight back in the media (Henisz 2014; Calveras and Ganuza 2016). 
Cooperating with regulators, while subject to resistance from managers (Hadani et al. 2016), 
may offer the most realistic opportunity to drive substantive change in company performance. 
We move now from describing the process model to outlining a future research agenda for 
shareholder influence over corporate environmental and social performance. We note 
weaknesses in the existing research, explain some barriers to research that have probably 
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contributed to these weaknesses, and suggest directions for future research, using our process 
model as an organising framework. 
TOWARDS A RESEARCH AGENDA 
A selection of research opportunities is summarised in Table 2, structured in line with the 
process model of Figure 1. Commencing with the context, the heterogeneity of the 
shareholding universe encourages research into whether different types of shareholders 
approach influencing differently. As we noted in our Introduction, little is known about non-
financial shareholder activism in the developing world, despite the serious social and 
environmental impacts of business in these geographies. Also, academic research is limited 
almost exclusively to listed companies, with little consideration of other ownership models 
such as private equity partnerships.  
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  Table 2: Future research opportunities 
 
Process 
model 
constituents 
 
 
Relevant 
Concepts 
 
Research opportunities 
Influencing 
context 
❖ Shareholder nature 
❖ Shareholder motivation 
❖ Company nature 
❖ Regulatory environment 
❖ Environmental and 
social issues 
• Determine whether different types of shareholders have a particular affinity for deploying particular interventions and enablers. 
• Study shareholder-management interactions outside the Anglo-American stock exchange context; in particular, the fast-growing economies 
and heavily impacted societies and environments of Asia, and companies not listed on stock exchanges. 
 
Shareholder 
interventions 
❖ Divestment 
❖ Dialogue 
❖ Proposals 
• Uncover shareholder decision-making processes and rationales that lead to the deployment of specific interventions to exercise shareholder 
influence. 
• Study situations of confidential dialogue between shareholders and management, researched, for example, on a case-study basis via 
participant observation or auto-ethnography. 
Enabling 
actors and 
tools 
❖ Coalitions 
❖ NGOs 
❖ Indices and codes 
❖ The media 
❖ Regulators 
 
• Uncover shareholder decision-making processes and rationales regarding the choice of enabling actors and tools. 
• Investigate the interplay between the enablers and the extent to which their effectiveness is path-dependent. 
• Determine the conditions under which the deployment of these enablers may lead to a reduction in managers’ perceptions of shareholder 
salience, for example via negative or contradictory signalling. 
• Determine the impact upon the influencing process of any misalignment between outcomes desired by shareholders and those desired by 
enabling actors, particularly within coalitions. 
• Determine whether NGOs that become shareholders increase or reduce their influence over managers.  
• Conduct a comparative analysis into whether the soft law approach of voluntary and self-regulation of companies is a more effective 
enabler for shareholder influence than approaches involving hard law. 
• Investigate the largely un-researched roles that other actors (for example, proxy advisory firms) may play, or may be able to play, in 
enabling shareholder influence over corporate environmental and social performance.  
Managers’ 
perceptions 
of salience  
❖ Power 
❖ Legitimacy 
❖ Urgency 
• Investigate how managers identify and perceive the salience of shareholders wishing to influence environmental and social performance 
vs. those interested in financial performance. 
• Identify other shareholder attributes that may affect managers’ perceptions of their salience. 
• Explore the extent to which a perception gap may exist between the influence shareholders actually wish to exert, and the influence that 
managers believe they wish to exert, perhaps using signalling theory as a basis.  
• Determine the conditions under which managers may take pre-emptive steps to reduce shareholder salience. 
Outcomes of 
shareholder 
influence 
❖ Symbolic 
❖ Substantive 
• Explore management rationales associated with symbolic and substantive responses to shareholder influence. 
• Conduct longitudinal analyses of outcome effectiveness, particularly with a view to exploring relationships between symbolic and 
substantive managerial responses, and how such responses may . 
• Explore aspects of company performance that trigger shareholder attempts to exert influence on its environmental and social performance. 
• Investigate what types of outcomes may lead to increased or decreased use by shareholders of the range of enabling actors and tools. 
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The decision-making processes that a shareholder may go through to decide on which 
interventions to deploy, and in what sequence, do not appear to have been investigated with 
any degree of rigour. It would be natural to extend such an investigation into a shareholder’s 
involvement of enablers too. At the level of individual influencing interventions, the 
divestment and proposals interventions are by their nature comparatively transparent. Little is 
known, however, of the inner workings of the dialogue process between shareholders and 
companies.  
The deployment for purposes of non-financial shareholder activism of each of the enabling 
actors and tools described in the process model provides fertile ground for future research. 
The interplay between them, the possible negative effects that some of them may have on 
managerial perceptions of shareholder salience, and the impact of differing agendas among 
the actors are all important issues, but currently under-researched. The degree to which taking 
up a shareholding increases the influence of an NGO is far from clear, as is the degree to 
which voluntary regulation of company environmental and social performance can replace a 
hard law approach. Furthermore, there are other actors such as proxy advisory firms that have 
the potential to play a significant but currently un-researched role in the influencing 
process—perhaps a missed opportunity for environmental and social activists to increase 
their salience with managers. 
As more research focuses on financial than non-financial activism, there is insufficient 
recognition that the use of the needle of influence by a single shareholding activist has a 
different quality to the wielding of a club by a hedge fund (Gantchev 2013; Goranova and 
Ryan 2014). Little is known about how managers identify and perceive the salience of 
shareholders that engage in specifically non-financial shareholder activism, and the range of 
shareholder attributes that may influence these perceptions. In addition, the decision-making 
processes followed by managers subject to such activism remain largely opaque to academic 
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enquiry. It is likely that significant gaps exist between the messages that shareholders attempt 
to send to managers, and how these managers perceive these influencing attempts. The cause 
and nature of these perception gaps should reward further study. Further, the conditions under 
which managers may take pre-emptive steps to reduce shareholder salience have not been 
studied. 
Lastly, there are significant weaknesses in the academic literature regarding the outcomes 
of social and environmental shareholder activism. Much of the empirical work focuses on 
symbolic outcomes such as the adoption of a new code of conduct (Lydenberg 2013). Little 
evidence is available to indicate substantive changes in corporate environmental and social 
performance, and less still that credibly links such changes to the interventions of 
shareholders. The perspectives of signalling and symbolism (or decoupling) should prove 
useful in such investigations. Company performance outcomes may also result in feedback 
loops, whether these be the original trigger for shareholder influencing, or the choice by 
shareholders of specific enablers to enhance their influence, both topics that would bear 
further investigation.  
Not surprisingly, most of the weaknesses identified above are linked closely to the barriers 
characteristic of research into this domain. At least part of the reason that less research has 
been carried out into such activism in developing economies and on companies not publicly 
listed is that useable information is less readily available. Another barrier to understanding 
this phenomenon is the potentially long-term nature of the influencing process and the likely 
path-dependence of the effectiveness of the influencing interventions and enablers. 
Longitudinal studies typically require more and patient resources than, say, a historical event 
study approach.  
The inherent confidentiality and anonymity associated with certain aspects of the 
processes may constitute the greatest barrier to research (Goranova et al. 2017). Detecting 
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what takes place during private dialogue between shareholders and managers, uncovering 
managers’ perceptions of shareholder salience, and discerning what takes place in company 
offices in response to shareholder influence, present serious challenges to researchers. The 
last is especially crucial for researchers attempting to discern the extent to which changes in 
corporate environmental and social performance are related to shareholder influence and 
which arise from other sources entirely. 
Pursuing this research agenda will extend our understanding of the burgeoning field of 
non-financial shareholder activism. It will allow further development of our process model, 
explaining influencing processes as yet imperfectly understood. Additional enablers may be 
found to play important roles in this form of activism, and guidance may be developed for 
shareholders seeking to influence corporate environmental and social performance, as well as 
for managers having to respond to such pressures. 
CONCLUSION 
This article has synthesised the literature concerned with shareholder influence over 
company environmental and social performance by means of a process model. The model 
views shareholder influence as exerted through shareholder interventions enhanced by 
enabling actors and tools, these choices being shaped by the context of this influence. 
Managers respond to these interventions depending on the shareholder’s perceived salience—
which again depends on the context—leading to symbolic and/or substantive outcomes. We 
have evaluated selected theoretical perspectives on the phenomenon of non-financial 
shareholder activism, noting several limitations of the agency, stakeholder and institutional 
perspectives. Hirschman’s constructs of exit, voice and loyalty provides a useful framework 
for the options available to shareholder activists, and social movement theory can explain 
how enablers facilitate the necessary social infrastructure and mobilising conditions for 
shareholder influence. The insights of stakeholder salience theory allow these interventions 
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and enablers to be analysed in terms of its constructs of power, legitimacy and urgency. 
Furthermore, the role of signalling between shareholders and managers is significant in the 
influencing process, together with the temptation for managers to engage in symbolic actions 
to avoid making substantive changes to practice. 
The constituents of context, interventions and enablers in our process model enable a rich 
analysis of antecedents to managers’ perceptions of shareholder salience. Our application of 
signalling theory to the ways in which shareholders attempt to influence managers warns of 
the dangers inherent to information asymmetry. Our distinction between symbolic and 
substantive responses by managers exposes attempts to avoid major changes to organisational 
functioning. We hope our proposed research agenda will prove useful to guide future 
scholarship in this important and burgeoning field. 
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APPENDIX 
REVIEW METHODOLOGY 
 
A preliminary scoping study of a selection of academic and practitioner literature was carried 
out by searching a range of databases and websites for articles and reports on the interaction 
between shareholders and companies with respect to environmental and social issues. This 
scoping study was used to identify terminology associated with the phenomenon of interest 
and, in particular, the relevant actors and types of interactions between them. 
The scoping study informed the development of search strings for the next stage of the 
review, which was undertaken following the protocol for systematic review developed by 
Tranfield et al. (2003) and Denyer and Tranfield (2009). The citation databases searched 
were Proquest, EBSCO Business Source Complete, Science Direct, Scopus and Web of 
Science.  
This stage was restricted to articles in scholarly peer-reviewed journals. Only articles 
written in English were included. There was no restriction placed on the year of publication 
other than those inherent in the operations of the electronic databases searched. Duplicates 
were removed from our sample, and an initial screening was carried out by reviewing each 
article’s title and removing references obviously unrelated to our study. A second screening 
was then conducted by reviewing the titles, abstracts and keywords for each of these articles. 
A third screening of the articles was carried out to determine relevance and quality ‘fit’. We 
were aided by using the Chartered Association of Business Schools’ Academic Journal 
Quality Guide (Harvey et al. 2010) ratings as a proxy for journal quality, excluding any 
articles from journals that were not listed in the guide.  
This set of identified articles from electronic sources was then added to from the academic 
literature by cross-referencing, advice from expert academic panel members (including a 
systematic review library technician) and academic research dialogues. Aided by serendipity, 
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these all contributed to the generation of our final sample of 127 articles from 58 academic 
journals, together with two articles from Social Science Research Network, one conference 
paper and seven books. This foundational body of literature was then analysed and 
synthesised using an integrative approach. References from the grey literature were included 
where appropriate in order to supplement, complement and illustrate the academic literature, 
in line with the guidelines in Adams et al. (in press). 
 
